SOURCE BOOKLET - INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this booklet until instructed to do so.
- This booklet contains all of the sources required for paper 1.
  - Section A  page 2
  - Section B  page 5
  - Section C  page 8
SECTION A

Prescribed Subject 1  The USSR under Stalin, 1924 to 1941

These sources relate to Stalin's agricultural policy.

SOURCE A  
An extract from an article in *Pravda* on 2 March 1930, in which Stalin appears to condemn forcible collectivisation.

But what really happens sometimes? Can it be said that the voluntary principle and the principle of allowing for local differences are not broken in a number of districts? No, unfortunately, that cannot be said. We know that in a number of Northern districts of the grain importing belt, where there are fewer favourable conditions for the immediate organisation of collective farms than in grain growing districts, the preparatory work in organising collective work is ignored and instead forms are filled in boasting of collective farms where none exist.

Or, take certain districts in Turkestan, where conditions are even more unfavourable for collective farms. We know that attempts have been made to “overtake and outstrip” the advanced districts of the USSR by methods of threatening to resort to military force, and deprive the peasants who do not want to join collective farms of water and manufactured goods.

The party’s policy rests on the voluntary principle, not force.

SOURCE B  

Russia today is in the grip of famine. I walked alone through villages and twelve collective farms. Everywhere there was the cry, “There is no bread; we are dying”. This cry came to me from every part of Russia. In a train a Communist denied to me that there was a famine. I threw down a crust of bread I had been eating from my own supply. A peasant, my fellow passenger, picked it up and ravenously ate it. I threw down orange peel. The peasant again grabbed it and ate it. The Communist said no more.

The government’s policy of collectivisation and the peasants’ resistance to it have brought Russia to the worst catastrophe since the famine of 1921 swept away the population of whole districts.
SOURCE C  

An extract from The Hinge of Fate, by Winston Churchill, London 1950, in which Churchill records his conversation with Stalin in 1943.

[Stalin said]
“It was fearful. Four years it lasted. It was absolutely necessary for Russia if we were to avoid the periodic famines, to plough the land with tractors. We must mechanise our agriculture. We gave tractors to the peasants, they were all spoiled in a few months. Only collective farms with workshops could handle tractors. We took the greatest trouble to explain it to the peasants. It was no use arguing with them. They always argue that they do not want the collective farms and would rather do without the tractors.”

[Churchill asked]
“These were what you call kulaks?”
“Yes”, he said, but he did not repeat the word. “It was bad, but necessary.”
“What happened?” I asked.
“Oh well,” he said, “many of them agreed to come in with us. Some of them were given land of their own to cultivate in the province of Tomsk, but most of them were very unpopular, and were wiped out by their labourers.”
After a pause he added: “We increased the food supply, and the quality of the grain.”

SOURCE D  


The price was awful. Probably four to five million people perished in 1932–3 from “de-kulakization” and from grain seizures. The dead and the dying were piled on to carts by the urban detachments and thrown into common graves. Pits were dug on the outskirts of villages for the purpose. Child survivors, their stomachs swollen through hunger, gnawed grass and begged for crusts.

Collectivisation was a rural nightmare. It is true that the average harvest in 1928–30 was good. But this was chiefly the product of excellent weather conditions. It certainly did not result from improved agricultural management; for often the collective chairmen were rural ne’er do wells [good for nothing persons] or inexpert party loyalists from the towns. Nor did the state fulfil its promise to supply 100,000 tractors by the end of the Five-Year Plan. Only half of these were built.
A photograph of roll-call at the New Life collective, a farm near Moscow, in the 1930s. The man on the left is a party official checking that the female agricultural workers have arrived for work.
SECTION B

Prescribed Subject 2  The emergence and development of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 1946 to 1964

These sources relate to the Great Leap Forward 1958–1961.


Our revolutions come one after another. Starting from the seizure of power in the whole country in 1949, there followed in quick succession the anti-feudal land reform, the agricultural co-operativization, and the socialist reconstruction of private industries, commerce, and handicrafts.

Now we must start a technological revolution so that we may overtake Britain in fifteen years. After fifteen years, when our foodstuffs and iron and steel become more plentiful, we shall take a much greater initiative. Our revolutions are like battles. After a victory, we must put forward a new task. In this way, cadres [party members] and the masses will forever be filled with revolutionary fervour instead of conceit [self-satisfaction], indeed they will have no time for conceit. With new tasks on their shoulders they are fully occupied.

SOURCE B  An extract from an article by Chen Boda (Ch’en Pota), a senior colleague of Mao’s, in the Communist Party journal Red Flag, July 1958.

Our direction is to combine step by step and in an orderly manner, workers (industry), peasants (agriculture), businessmen (exchange), students (culture and education), and soldiers (military) into a large commune, which is to form our nation’s basic social unit. In this kind of commune, industry, agriculture and exchange are the people’s basic working life; culture and education are the people’s spiritual life which reflects their working material life. The total arming and directing of the people is to protect this material and spiritual life for the Chinese people.
SOURCE C  An eye witness account of the “back yard steel furnaces”: Mao said that 90 million people were mobilised to construct and operate furnaces.

Furnace fields are everywhere in Lushan county, plots of hundreds of small earthen furnaces were “growing” in late autumn when I was there, alongside fields of sweet potatoes and tobacco. From a distance the leaping flames and columns of smoke look like some new construction site accidentally ablaze [on fire]. On the scene the atmosphere is like a fair ground, with scores of people bustling in and out of the rows of furnaces.

Small red flags fly overhead, indicating the various groups of steel workers who are organised like military units. The air is filled with the sound of music from local operas coming from an amplifier above the site, and accompanied by the hum of blowers, the panting of gasoline engines, the honking of heavily-laden lorries, and the bellowing of oxen hauling ore and coal.

At one of the ten foot high furnaces, a man climbs a wooden ladder to dump coke and firewood through the top. He descends, and another man goes up to calm down the fire with a rake. A third man follows to pull the hot rake away from the blast of the fire. Beside the furnace several men, laughing and joking, work a huge home-made wooden bellows.


The experiment into which Mao bullied China did not work. An evening of hope and excitement gave way to a morning of dismay.

A communal spirit grew, and the ordinary person felt anew his Chineseness. A new framework of rural government – fusing work life and civic life – came into existence. The Leap was at first a political success in that 600 million responded with impressive loyalty to Mao’s summons – the last time China’s peasants would do so.

But as economic policy the Leap was a disaster. China lost five years on its new long march to modernity. And the new rural framework did not last. Grain output fell. By 1960 there was widespread hunger for the first time in Mao’s China. Grumbling in the ranks of the peasants turned to minor revolt in five provinces. Mao’s predictions on steel production and the time needed for agricultural mechanisation proved absurdly optimistic.

A cruel blow for Mao was the revival of capitalist habits. As food grew short, farmers who had grain and vegetables on hand pedalled into the towns and sold them on the black market at exorbitant [very high] prices, then spent the proceeds eating and drinking too much.
Women of the Shiu Shin commune park their guns while they hoe: a photograph taken in 1958, the year the drive to organize all of rural China into communes began.
SECTION C

Prescribed Subject 3 The Cold War, 1960 to 1979

These sources relate to changes in the nature of the Cold War in the period 1960–1969.

SOURCE A

An extract from a speech by Nikita Khrushchev to the Supreme Soviet, 14 January 1960.

There exist two camps in the world today, each with a different social system. The countries in these camps form their policies on entirely different lines. In these circumstances the problem of peaceful coexistence – that is, of safeguarding the world against the disaster of a military conflict between these two essentially hostile systems, between the groups of countries in which the two systems dominate – is of supreme importance. It is necessary to see to it that the inevitable struggle between them becomes solely a struggle of ideologies and of peaceful competition [...]. Each side will demonstrate its advantages to the best of its ability, but war as a means of settling this dispute must be rejected. This then is coexistence as we Communists see it.

SOURCE B

Cartoon by Vicky (a British cartoonist), published in November 1962. The people in the cartoon are Kennedy, Khrushchev and Mao. The word “Chicken!” is used in some countries to suggest someone is withdrawing from or failing in some activity through fear or lack of nerve.

“CHICKEN!” CALLS MAO FROM SAFETY
SOURCE C

Extracts from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Joint resolution by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, August 1964.

Section 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant [consistent] with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asian collective defence treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member of the Southeast Asian defence treaty requesting assistance in defence of its freedom.

Section 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by joint resolution of the Congress. Approved 10 August 1964.

SOURCE D

An extract from a speech by Marshal Lin to the 9th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing, 1 April 1969.

Since Brezhnev came to power, the Soviet revisionist clique has intensified its suppression of the Soviet people and increased the restoration of capitalism. Externally it has stepped up its collusion with US imperialism and its suppression of the revolutionary struggles of the people of various countries, intensified its exploitation of the various east European countries, and increased its threat of aggression against China. Its decision to send hundreds of thousands of troops to occupy Czechoslovakia and its armed provocation against China on our territory are two unacceptable acts carried out recently by Soviet revisionism. In order to justify its aggression the Soviet revisionists declare their theory of “limited sovereignty”. What does this rubbish mean? It means that your sovereignty is limited while his is unlimited. You won’t obey him? He will exercise his “international dictatorship” over you.

SOURCE E


The age of America’s nearly total dominance of the world stage was drawing to a close. America’s nuclear superiority was eroding [diminishing], and its economic supremacy was being challenged by the dynamic growth of Europe and Japan, both of which had been restored by American resources and sheltered by American security guarantees. Vietnam finally signalled that it was high time to reassess America’s role in the developing world, and to find some sustainable ground between abdication [giving up control] and over-extension.

New opportunities for American diplomacy were presenting themselves as serious cracks opened up in what had been viewed throughout the Cold War as the communist monolith. Khrushchev’s revelations in 1956 of the brutalities of Stalin’s rule and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, had weakened the ideological appeal of communism for the rest of the world. Even more important, the split between China and the Soviet Union undermined Moscow’s pretense to be the leader of a united communist movement. All of these developments suggested that there was scope for a new diplomatic flexibility.